Earnings management para evitar reportar pérdidas: Chile, 2010-2014
Keywords:
Manipulacion del beneficio contable, Distribucion de frecuencias, Beneficio neto, Perdida, Umbral de beneficiosAbstract
Propósito. Examinar si las firmas no financieras que estuvieron registradas en la Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros de Chile (SVS) manipularon la cifra de beneficios para evitar reportar pérdidas o disminuciones en las ganancias, durante el período 2010-2014.
Diseño/metodología/enfoque. Se analizaron la distribución de los beneficios netos y la distribución de los cambios en los beneficios netos de las firmas, de acuerdo con la metodología de Burgstahler y Dichev (1997).
Hallazgos. Los resultados mostraron frecuencias inusualmente bajas de pequeñas pérdidas y de pequeñas disminuciones en los beneficios, y frecuencias inusualmente altas de pequeñas utilidades y de pequeños incrementos en las ganancias. Ambos resultados fueron estadísticamente significativos.
Implicaciones prácticas. El estudio presentó evidencia de posibles prácticas de earnings management para evitar reportar pérdidas o disminuciones en el beneficio neto durante el período 2010-2014. Estos resultados permitirían identificar empresas “sospechosas” de earnings management, y aumentarían la probabilidad de detectar las firmas que manipularon al alza el beneficio reportado en los estados financieros o que —en un caso extremo— cometieron un fraude aún no revelado.
Originalidad/valor. Los resultados de este tipo de estudios podrían ser útiles para focalizar actividades de monitorización y fiscalización para una mayor transparencia en el mercado bursátil.
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